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Prichard’s Heresy
SANDY BERKOVSKI
Abstract
H. A. Prichard ascribed to Aristotle a form of closeted hedonism. Aristotle allegedly
misunderstood his own task: while his avowed goal in Nicomachean Ethics is to give
an account of the nature of happiness, his real goal must be to offer an account of the
factors most efficiently generating happiness. The reason is that the nature of happi-
ness is enjoyment, and this fact is supposed to have been recognised by Aristotle and
his audience. While later writers judged Prichard’s view obviously mistaken, I argue
that the issue is more complex. In the process of reconstructing the logical skeleton of
Prichard’s argument I show that Aristotle may have had to endorse the identification
of the subject’s good with that subject’s psychological satisfaction. But I also argue
that, while making prior assumptions about the meaning of ‘eudaimonia’,
Aristotle made no such assumptions about the nature of eudaimonia.
1. Introduction
In his article ‘TheMeaning of agathon in theEthics of Aristotle’H.A.
Prichard ascribed to Aristotle a form of closeted hedonism.1
Aristotle, Prichard argued, had allegedly misunderstood his own
task in the Nicomachean Ethics and misled his readers about its real
point. Aristotle assumed right at the start, without any special
reason, that pleasure is the highest value, and, therefore, what was
left for him to discover was the surest way leading to pleasure.
Theoretical speculation or social virtues, on this view, are nothing
but mere instruments for obtaining pleasure. And while his avowed
goal in NE is to give an account of the nature of good (agathon), his
real goal must be to offer an account of the factors most efficiently
generating pleasure.
Prichard’s argument for this, as he admitted, ‘heretical’ conclusion
can be summarised as follows. Every deliberate action, according to
Aristotle, has a purpose. That purpose may be instrumental (for
the sake of another purpose, di’ heteron) or ultimate (for the sake of
1 The article originally appeared in Philosophy 37 (1935), 27–39. All
quotations are from H.A. Prichard, Moral Writings (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
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itself, di’ auto). There are different goals which Aristotle admits as
ultimate (for every agent). Among them are honour, practical
wisdom, and pleasure. Now, the theory of motivation must tell us
the character of the ultimate purpose. In the opening sentences of
NEAristotle maintains that every action is done for the sake of ‘some-
thing good’ (agathon ti). Thus both ultimate and instrumental goals
are necessarily ‘good’. The meaning of agathon is left unclear by
Aristotle. What should be clear though is that the ultimate goals he
lists, such as honour or practical wisdom, must have the common
character of goodness. That is, those goals are ultimate precisely
because we pursue them ‘as good’, or ‘like good’ (hōs agathon). But
this is inconsistent. For it will turn out that we, after all, pursue
these putatively ultimate goals not for the sake of themselves, but
for the agathon they possess. And the conclusion we ought to draw
is that the real ultimate goal is exactly that agathon.
Now, in general there is a possibility of identifying agathon with
some form of primitive ‘goodness’. But, Prichard thinks, in talking
about agathon Aristotle always stresses the idea of the agent’s own
agathon. Thus, whenever we do something ‘good’ we contribute to
our own eudaimonia. So, agathon in NE cannot refer to ‘goodness’.
And the only other alternative left is the identification of agathon
with our own psychological satisfaction (or ‘pleasure’, or ‘enjoy-
ment’). The last several pages of the article Prichard devotes to
showing that Aristotle in fact endorsed precisely this interpretation.
And the evidence is difficult to get, since we all know that the
highest good (or at all events, the highest achievable good), according
to NE, is eudaimonia. On the other hand, as we also know well, in
I.7–8 Aristotle identifies eudaimonia with the virtuous activity of
the soul, while early in I.5 rejecting its identification with pleasure,
wealth, and honour. But, Prichard argues, a literal interpretation of
the text would be misleading. For Aristotle does not intend to eluci-
date the meaning of eudaimonia. There is no question that the Greek
word ‘eudaimonia’ means happiness. Thus neither honour, nor
wealth, nor pleasure (all of them the rejected options), nor the virtu-
ous activity of the soul (Aristotle’s preferred option) are supposed to
be equated with eudaimonia. Rather, all of those are nothing but
causal factors apt to produce happiness more or less efficiently.
A corollary of this reasoning is Aristotle’s endorsement of psycho-
logical hedonism: the only final goal, one desired for its own sake, is
pleasure (113).2 But the real target is not just a theory of motivation
2 From here on this style of reference indicates the pages in Prichard,
op. cit.
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which is what psychological hedonism is. The real target is the entire
content of Aristotle’s ethical theory. The question of the nature of
happiness is, for Aristotle, never simply a descriptive question of
what most people pursue. It is always a question of what is good
for the people to pursue. The notion of good introduces a normative
ethical element into the theory. If we interpret the final good and
happiness as pleasure, then we say, in effect, that what is good for
X is to pursue his own pleasure. This is not even the doctrine of
ethical hedonism, the view that ethical value is constituted by
pleasure, mine or someone else’s. It is a more specific doctrine of
ethical hedonistic egoism. Aristotle, if committed to psychological
hedonism, would end up claiming that the ethical value of X’s
action (or life) is determined by the amount of X’s pleasure it pro-
duces (or contains). But to endorse this sort of view is to devoid
ethical theory of any visible significance, or, in what perhaps
amounts to the same thing, to profess allegiance to moral scepticism.
The project of NE would appear to aim at producing practical pre-
cepts of how best to achieve your own pleasure, and make it lasting,
certain, and free of boredom.3
A more rigourous derivation, applied to the case of moral actions,
runs as follows. Assume psychological hedonism (PH). Then also
assume that motives are necessarily a factor in the determination of
moral value. That is, X is right only if a particular kind of motive
is present in X. This is the principle of right motive (RM).
Combined with PH, this entails that moral actions are done with
only one kind of (ultimate) motive, the motive of increasing the
agent’s own pleasure.
Now it could of course be that moral value consisted in something
other than the increase of pleasure. But that would presumably mean
that agents can only be morally good if they fail to achieve what they
set out to achieve. It is plausible to assume that the achievement of the
genuinely moral agents is in tune with their motivation. This is the
principle of moral success (MS). And of course we could also
resolve that it is impossible to become a moral agent. Nevertheless
we could, on the contrary, come to believe not only that it is possible,
but that there actually aremorally good agents (the existential premiss
E). What those agents wish to achieve, and in fact do achieve, is pre-
cisely the increase of their own pleasure. From those joint
3 While Prichard does not explicitly connect psychological hedonism to
any one ethical doctrine, the drift of the argument is plain to see already at
the beginning (102). The connection is made in the discussion of Plato and
Butler in the article ‘Duty and Interest’, reprinted inMoral Writings.
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assumptions of PH, RM, MS, and E, the conclusion to follow is the
hedonistic variation of ethical egoism.
It is easy to see that each of the premisses in our derivation, with the
possible exception of psychological hedonism, is unambiguously
endorsed by Aristotle (e.g. in II.4). And if PH could also be
imputed to him, then the implication would not only be a controver-
sial theory of motivation. The real victim would be the ethical theory
expressed in NE.
2. Austin’s critique
A detailed scrutiny of Prichard’s argument is found in J.L. Austin’s
posthumously published paper.4 A uniform consensus among the
later commentators is that Austin had decisively refuted Prichard’s
view.5 Austin makes a number of claims, some of them involving a
painstaking textual analysis both of NE and Prichard’s article. But
the central objection relates to the meaning of ‘eudaimonia’. In
Austin’s view, Prichard mistakenly identifies the lexical meaning of
the Greek term ‘eudaimonia’ with ‘feeling pleased’, or ‘feeling
happy’. This is, according to Austin, the main implicit premiss of
Prichard’s entire argument. Given this premiss, Prichard is able to
maintain that Aristotle’s discussion is supposed to yield the factors
producing a certain psychological state (viz. eudaimonia). Aristotle
could not be interested in discovering the ingredients of eudaimonia
itself, since its nature should have been clear at the outset.
This rings true, as we find the following passage:
[W]hat [Aristotle] is really maintaining is that though the nature
of our ultimate aim, happiness, is known to us, for we all know
the nature of that for which the word ‘happiness’ stands, we are
doubtful about the proximate means to it... (Prichard, op. cit.,
112–113)
4 See J.L. Austin, ‘Agathon and eudaimonia in theEthics of Aristotle’, in
Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
5 See e.g. T. Hurka, ‘Underivative Duty: Prichard on Moral
Obligation’, Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010), 111–134, M.
Nussbaum, ‘Mill between Aristotle and Bentham’, Dædalus 133 (2004),
60–68, and C.C.W. Taylor, ‘Review of Aristotle: A Collection of Critical
Essays’, Philosophical Review 78 (1969), 402–405. ‘Prichard seems too insig-
nificant a target for Austin’s big guns’, says Taylor. I hope to show that, with
proper equipment, the sizes should measure differently.
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And similarly another fragment:
What [Aristotle] undoubtedly meant and thought others meant
by eudaimonia is happiness. Plainly, too, what he thought men
differed about was not the nature of happiness but the conditions
of its realization, and when he says that eudaimonia is [a virtuous
activity of the soul], what he really means is that the latter is what
is required for the realization of happiness. (111–112)
Austin remarks, first, that this latter fragment is strange in that
Aristotle is made to interpret eudaimonia in the English metalan-
guage.6More important of course is the fact that ‘happiness’ is appar-
ently taken by Prichard to refer to pleasure, or feeling happy, or
feeling pleased. Austin cites three additional passages in Prichard in
which the locutions of ‘pleasure’ or ‘state of happiness’ – in short,
of psychological feelings – are apparently substituted for ‘happiness’
tout court.7
Austin goes on to claim that the lexical meaning of ‘eudaimonia’ is
given by to eu zēn kai to eu prattein (‘living and acting well’), that
Aristotle declines to define agathon, but that agathon is certainly
not lexically equivalent to telos. These claims, interesting and impor-
tant as they are, do not carry the burden of Austin’s argument. They
are auxiliary propositions intended to buttress the main contention
which lies in rejecting the eudaimonia/happiness equivalence.
Now, suppose for themoment that Austin’s charge is sound. Then,
I think, there are some uncomfortable questions one will have to face.
In the first place, how plausible would it be to believe that Prichard
had such a mistaken understanding of the lexical meaning of eudai-
monia? Surely his presumed linguistic incompetence cannot be at-
tested by the mention of the English word ‘happiness’, since this is
the translation adopted, e.g. by Ross and Rackham, neither of
whom could possibly be suspected of such a gross mistake.
Secondly, if Prichard indeed thought eudaimonia to mean some-
thing like ‘feeling pleased’, then his whole argument is no more
than a tedious superfluity. To prove Aristotle’s psychological hedon-
ism, he could fasten on the idea from Book I (putting together
1095a19 and 1094a22-23) that all actions are done for the sake of eu-
daimonia, replace ‘eudaimonia’ with ‘feeling pleased’, and draw the
desired conclusion. To anyone who has this lexical meaning of eudai-
monia, the proof of psychological hedonism would be entirely
straightforward.
6 Op. cit., 11.
7 Op. cit., 5–6.
507
Prichard’s Heresy
Thirdly, it would be a major challenge for such a commentator
simply to make sense of numerous passages such as ‘the question is
asked, whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habitu-
ation’ (1099b10), ‘must no one at all, then, be called happy while he
lives’ (1100a10-a11), ‘happiness, then, is the best, noblest, and most
pleasant thing in the world’ (1099a24), ‘any chance person – even a
slave – can enjoy the bodily pleasures no less than the best man; but
no one assigns to a slave a share in happiness’ (1177a7-9). In all of
them Aristotle addresses himself to the audience which is supposed
to share the same linguistic competence, but which may, or may not
yet, be converted to his own theory of eudaimonia. The bulk of
Prichard’s argument, had Austin’s objection been sound, had to be
occupied with explaining away these passages, rather than with the
proof of psychological hedonism. Granted, Prichard believes
Aristotle to have misrepresented the point of his philosophical
enquiry, so that this confusion may provide an explanation of a
passage like 1095a21 where Aristotle asks ‘what happiness is’. But
Prichard never makes an undeniably preposterous accusation that
Aristotle misrepresented his, or his audience’s, linguistic competence.
It has to be noted that Austin recognises (e.g. in his quotation from
Wordsworth) the monumental absurdity of the view he attributed to
Prichard. But oddly he never pauses for a moment to reflect that the
very fact of such an absurdity should put his own critique in doubt.
3. The logical structure of Prichard’s argument
Unless, therefore, we are content with denying Prichard a very basic
philosophical ability, Austin’s refutation is itself anything but
immediately plausible. It is, I think, worth taking another look at
Prichard’s argument. Even if Prichard’s conclusion were absurd, it
is necessary to see just what reasons led him tomaintain these absurd-
ities. In fact I am going to argue that there is muchmore to Prichard’s
argument than the happiness= pleasure equation, and that, while his
argument is fallacious, the error he committed is not at all self-
evident.
According to our reconstruction in §1, Prichard’s argument should
(roughly) run as follows:
1. Some values, Aristotle believes, are pursued for their own sake
(di’ auto) (104–105).
2. However, Aristotle’s other claim is that they are also pursued
‘as good’ (hōs agathon) (105, 107).
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3. Hence, according to Aristotle, the ultimate goal must be the
‘good’ (agathon), rather than the values such as honour or prac-
tical wisdom.
4. The nature of agathon is not clear (passim).
5. Agathon in NE amounts to an egocentric ‘goodness-for-me’
(109).
6. But ‘goodness-for-me’ should be identified with ‘my gratifica-
tion’ (109).
7. There is evidence that Aristotle endorsed the claim #6:
(a) Eudaimonia is supposed to be our ultimate goal (111).
(b) But eudaimonia amounts to the agent’s gratification (112).
8. Therefore, Aristotle is a psychological hedonist. (113).
Contrary to Austin’s objection, the identification of eudaimonia with
gratification does not come as a premiss of Prichard’s main argument.
It rather is supposed to offer direct textual support for the claim
that Aristotle in fact endorsed psychological hedonism in NE. As
our reconstruction makes clear, the main argument has a different
form – namely, that in the light of some other views he indisputably
held Aristotle is left virtually no choice but to be a psychological
hedonist.
Prichard’s argument naturally falls into three parts. In ##1–4 we
are told that the real ultimate goal in Aristotle is the good, that
perplexing agathon. The point of ##5–6 is to present a perfectly
general dilemma – either agathon is ‘goodness’, or else it is ‘personal
gratification’ – and to maintain that Aristotle cannot embrace its
first horn. And the point of ##7a–7b is to provide textual evidence
for the idea that Aristotle indeed embraced the second horn of the
dilemma.
If this is how Prichard’s reasoning proceeds, his alleged linguistic
misconception of ‘eudaimonia’ plays a rather minor role in it. The
most it enables us conclude would be that Aristotle actually endorsed
a version of hedonism. There are though two other claims more am-
bitious in scope and more important for the evaluation of Prichard’s
argument as a whole: that there is a dilemma of irreducible goodness
and personal gratification, and that Aristotle ought to have endorsed a
version of hedonism, perhaps malgré lui.
4. Good-for-me, nobility, sacrifice
Like Austin, I will have little to say about the claims ##1–4. It seems
fairly plausible, judging from Book I of NE, that Aristotle’s final
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goals have to be ‘good’, and that there must be a tight connection
between purposeful activities and the ‘good’. At all events I think
the most interesting and important statements, as far as the theory
of hedonism and Aristotle’s interpretation are concerned, are the
statements ##5–7.
To begin with #5, a couple of preliminary comments. It is clear
from Prichard’s text that the dilemma he examines concerns only
goodness-for-me and goodness-for-someone. A Moorean option of
intrinsic and wholly impersonal goodness simpliciter is not on the
cards. Also, Prichard does not claim that ‘good’, according to
Aristotle, is to be interpreted in absolutely every context as ‘good-
for-me’. His concern is solely with the goodness of our goals. So in
general the formula:
Necessarily, X is good only if X is good-for-me, (1)
is in no way concerned with just any X. It features in the argument so
far as X is my action, goal, or any other element of my ethical practice.
My desire has a certain object, and I desire this object as good (per
##1–4). That is, I desire it as good-for-me. This restriction to
ethical practice should also explain why goodness simpliciter is
ignored. The fact of ethical practice, of acts directed at different indi-
viduals, is taken for granted. Even if some element of my practice
were good/bad simpliciter (and this goodness were to be recognised
as a distinct category), there would necessarily have to be someone
for whom it is good/bad. This leaves open the question whether,
say, a painting could be good simpliciter without being good for
anyone.
The choice, then, is between the claim (1) and a weaker claim:
Necessarily, X is good only if there is n such that X is good-for-n.
Now ascribing to Aristotle the claim (1) has to sound illogical. A vir-
tuous man certainly desires his virtuous activities. And it is plausible
that some of these activities are desired by him precisely because they
are good for him. A typical example would be temperance. But there
are other virtues, such as generosity and courage, which in many in-
stances are desired by the virtuous man for the sake of someone else –
that is, because they are good-for-someone-else.
However, Prichard reasons, when we look closer into Aristotle’s
discussion of both courage and generosity, we will discover a
thoroughly egoistic picture. The key textual support comes from
the discussion of nobility (to kalon) in IX.8. Aristotle there
seems to claim that a generous person in his acts of generosity
assigns a greater good to himself, and that herein should lay the
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explanation of such acts. But a one-line comment does not do
justice to this very complex passage. It deserves first to be
quoted at length:
[W]hat the good man ought to do he does; for the reason in each
of its possessors always chooses what is good (i) for itself, and the
good man obeys his reason. It is true of the good man too that he
does many acts (ii) for the sake of his friends and his country, and if
necessary (iii) dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth
and honours and in general the goods that are objects of compe-
tition, gaining for himself nobility; (iv) since he would prefer a
short period of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment,
a twelvemonth of noble life tomany years of humdrum existence,
and one great and noble action to many trivial ones [i.e. ‘many
trivial successes’: pollas kai mikras]. Now those who die for
others doubtless attain this result; it is therefore a great
prize that they (v) choose for themselves. They will throw away
wealth too on condition that their friends will gain more; for
while a man’s friend gains wealth he himself achieves nobility;
he is therefore assigning (vi) the greater good to himself.
The same too is true of honour and office; all these things he
will sacrifice to his friend; for this is noble and laudable for
himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good, (vii) since he
chooses nobility before all else. (NE, 1169a16–a33, numbering
and italics added)
Aristotle here is on record stressing the priority of egocentric good.
But no one should fail to observe how strange his view is. A man sa-
crifices his life to assign a greater good – not to his friends or his
country, as one might believe, but to himself. To make sense of
this, let us examine the passage in more detail. (i) That reason
chooses what is good for itself is of course no proof of any egoistic
nature of virtuous motivation. Apart from the fact that in the text
Aristotle does not make reason choose what is good only for itself,
it is also possible that reason chooses what is good for NN, but
what is truly good for NN may simply coincide with some non-
egocentric good. Further, (ii) Aristotle explicitly asserts that a
virtuous man can work for the sake of other people alone, and even
(iii) sacrifice his life for them. But the explanation offered in (iv) is
cryptic. As its first part involving pleasure makes clear, Aristotle
rejects a summative conception of value, on which no matter how
great (finite) value an action X has, a sufficient number of actions –
each having lesser values than X – will, in total, exceed the value of
X. The way this sentence is constructed suggests that the claim
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about nobility is supposed to obtain by analogy from the claim about
pleasure. However, both that latter claim and the analogy itself lack
any obvious justification.
One tempting thought is that Aristotle is committed to the Millian
idea of incommensurable values. A day of philosophical study is more
enjoyable than a year of relaxing on the beach not because it carries
more quantity of pleasure, but because the first activity has the
higher intrinsic quality. Some textual support can be found in
1175b39-1176a3 where pleasures are differentiated on account of
their source. Pleasures of sight will be superior in ‘purity’ to pleasures
of touch, since the activity of sight is ‘purer’ than the activity of touch
(both types of pleasure are genuine pleasures, unlike morally evil
pleasures declared earlier fake pleasures altogether). However, be
that as it may with pleasures, there is as yet no ground to extend
the solution to the noble.
Taking a different route (though with little textual support), one
could say that the passage reveals Aristotle’s indifference to the idea
of maximizing pleasure. This in turn would provide a reason for dis-
tinguishing his view from any recognizable form of hedonism. The
problem with this move is, again, that, whatever the appeal it
carries for the theory of pleasure, it makes not a lot of sense for the
theory of nobility. Why should we abstain from the greater amount
of nobility delivered in successive small steps and prefer the
amount of nobility delivered in one go? Perhaps dying for your
country is individually the most noble action. But why should we
not prefer repeated acts of generosity – each less noble than sacrificing
your life – made possible by saving our life in that situation of
sacrifice?
A possible way out could be found were we to consider, if only for
the sake of argument at this stage, a hedonist reading of the passage.8
A hedonist presumably must value nobility to the extent it generates
enjoyment. The analogymentioned earlier would rest on the effective
reduction of the noble to the enjoyable. If we had such a reduction, we
could e.g. employ the idea of incommensurability. We could say that,
since the act of sacrifice carries with it such a great amount of enjoy-
ment, it is preferable to many minute noble acts. However, this move
is equally baffling: how could anyone actually enjoy the sacrifice of
his own life?
8 I put aside aNietzsche-inspired interpretation which would name aes-
thetic value as the common reason for the good man’s preferences in both
cases.
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Our best hope, I think, is the discussion of courage in III.8.
Aristotle there describes the courage of a citizen-soldier that most
closely resembles the ‘true courage’ described in III.6–7:
Citizen-soldiers seem to face dangers because of the penalties
imposed by the laws and the reproaches they would otherwise
incur, and because of the honours they win by such action. . . .
This kind of courage is most like [true courage], because it is
due to virtue [di’ areten]; for it is due to shame and to desire of
a noble object (i.e. honour) and avoidance of disgrace, which is
ignoble. (NE, 1116a18-20, 1116a26-29)
It is somewhat obscure just why the courage of citizen-soldiers is sup-
posed to be not exactly equivalent to ‘true courage’. But whatever the
difference, small as it could be, Aristotle is fairly explicit in insisting
on the virtuousness of the citizen-soldier’s courage. It appears,
then, that the explanation why citizen-soldiers choose to sacrifice
their lives is in their desire to avoid various punishments for
cowardice.
Given this result, (v) is interpreted easily. The prize the good man
chooses for himself is the avoidance of dishonour. That is why he
chooses the prize for himself. For the same reason Aristotle finds it
natural to run heroism and charity together. Doubtless charity can
carry with it tangible experienceable honours, whilst a hero may be
denied them in death. But in (vi) they are put together, since a hedo-
nist resolution has already been accepted in (iv). According to this
reading, then, the justification cited in (vii) should not be taken at
face value. The choice of to kalon is not ultimate. It is itself explained
by the desire to avoid dishonour and shame.
A final comment: despite the appearance to the contrary (‘a twelve-
month of noble life preferred to many years of humdrum existence’),
Aristotle can hardly intend to embellish self-sacrifice per se. A life
which required sacrificing your life or health in a battle must be less
good than an otherwise virtuous life which did not require any
such action. People are not expected to chase an opportunity of
giving their lives for the country, nor is the very fact of such oppor-
tunity a necessary condition of a genuinely happy life. On the other
hand, people must use every opportunity to develop their virtuous
dispositions, including courage. But the actual circumstance of sacri-
ficing your life should be seen as a result of a misfortune caused by
factors outside of your control. Given that circumstance, however, a
virtuous agent will try to make the best of it (see also I.10). And
the best outcome for the virtuous agent in that circumstance is the
avoidance of shame.
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The nobility discussion provides support for #5, as well as for
Aristotle’s identifying ‘good-for-me’ with ‘my gratification’ (claim
#6). So far, however, we have seen no reason why anyone would
accept any such identification in the first place. Prichard says:
Once, however, we regard this answer [that agathon= good-for-
n.–SB] as having been excluded once for all, there seems to be no
alternative to attributing to Aristotle a familiar turn of thought to
which we are all very prone and which is exemplified in Mill and
T. H. Green. (109)
A little later he talks of an ‘almost irresistible’ appeal of this turn of
thought. The wording suggests that the good-for-me interpretation
of agathon is perceived by Prichard as a honey trap. While he does
not say why this interpretation is in fact false, he explains the ‘irresis-
tible’ appeal of the honey trap. Suppose we have a list of goals which
we believe we desire for their own sake (call them ‘u-goals’). The list
may include theoretical knowledge, moral action, or some kind of
professional accomplishment. We then enquire into the nature of
our desire of those u-goals. And we notice, by way of our enquiry,
that not only do we consistently enjoy each and every one of our u-
goals, but also that it would be impossible to desire them unless
they provided enjoyment. We are then apt to conclude (perhaps erro-
neously) that our desires had as their ‘real’ ultimate object not the
items on that list of u-goals, but rather the pleasure we obtain by
achieving them. This idea of the causal link between our u-goals
and pleasure gets perverted when we succumb to another temptation
and proclaim pleasure a property of u-goals. The analogy Prichard
draws is with the secondary qualities such as taste or smell. Apples
and garlic produce certain sensations of taste and smell in us. But
many people tend to attribute, correctly or not, the properties of
taste and smell to apples and garlic themselves.
A similar perversion – or at least what Prichard regards as
perversion – occurred to Aristotle’s account of u-goals. Aristotle
catalogued certain u-goals, subsequently noticing that we derive plea-
sure from all of them. But rather than to insist on a causal relation
between those goals and pleasure, he directly attributed a property
of pleasantness to them. And his way of expressing this idea comes
by way of the claim #2, i.e. by saying that all these goals are ‘good’,
and that we pursue them ‘as good’. The locutions of ‘good’ are
equivalent to ‘good-for-me’ (claim #5). Thus to infer Aristotle’s
psychological hedonism we have to establish his endorsement
of the connection between ‘good-for-me’ and ‘my gratification’, i.e.
his endorsement of the claim #6.
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5. ‘Eudaimonia’ and eudaimonia
As I have already indicated, the best textual evidence one can get for
the good-for-me=my gratification formula is by looking into
Aristotle’s treatment of those hard cases where egocentric goodness
and egocentric pleasure apparently have to come apart. The possi-
bility of self-sacrifice is precisely such a case. In examining this
kind of situations we can show, I think, that for Aristotle
the equation always holds. But Prichard elected to go in a totally
different direction: he hoped to extract the same conclusion from
Book I.
We now, therefore, have to attend to the final part of the argument
dealing with eudaimonia. In the passage quoted back in §2 Prichard
says that by ‘eudaimonia’Aristotle meant happiness. One way to un-
derstand this statement is to say, with Austin, that ‘happiness’ in
English should mean something like ‘feeling pleased’, and then to
argue that the lexical meaning of ‘eudaimonia’ is in Prichard’s
view equivalent to ‘feeling pleased’. For the reasons mentioned in
§2 this interpretation leads to obvious puzzles. It is strange to
think that Prichard could be unaware of them. Even if his view
cannot be sustained in the end, its evident fatuity should be ac-
counted for.
Prichard’s basic idea is plain enough: Aristotle did not intend to
give us a novel lexical meaning of ‘eudaimonia’. Of course he must
have assumed that ‘eudaimonia’ was a word understood by his audi-
ence. And to his audience it meant the same as the word ‘happiness’
means to an English speaker. A native speaker, Greek and English,
must have some competence with the words ‘eudaimonia’ and ‘happi-
ness’ respectively. Unlike a question ‘Who is glücklich?’, the ques-
tions ‘What is happiness?’ or ‘Who is a happy man?’ should be
understood by that speaker by virtue of his linguistic competence.
The term ‘eudaimonia’, then, is native to the language of
Aristotle’s audience in the same way the term ‘happiness’ is native
to the language of the English speakers. But if so, how could there
be such serious disagreements about the extension of the term? We
disagree about how to use the terms ‘happy life’ or ‘happy person’
in our language. Some say that happiness is physical pleasure, and
that a person is happy when and only when he has lots of such plea-
sures. Others might analogously link happiness with political success
or virtue. These are the kinds of disagreement registered by Aristotle
in I.V.
Given the fact of a disagreement so radical, one could regard these
speakers as users of different dialects. In one such dialect the word
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‘happiness’ would mean pleasure, in another honour, and so on. But
if we accept the idea of different dialects, it would be difficult to un-
derstand the purpose of Aristotle’s enquiry. It would thenmost natu-
rally be taken to aim at introducing a novel use for the term
‘eudaimonia’. Some people, on this view,mean by ‘eudaimonia’ plea-
sure, while others honour. And Aristotle simply asks us to mean by it
a virtuous activity of the soul. That is, I think, the conclusion against
which Prichard protests. Rightly so: if this is how we understand the
debate, the matter at stake would be narrowly philological and lack
any major philosophical import.
Theremust be sufficient common ground shared by the debate par-
ticipants in order for that debate not to be terminological. Thus the
question becomes: what are the assumptions about eudaimonia
made by Aristotle in NE? Aristotle’s audience is supposed to consist
of the men of ‘good upbringing’. The facts ‘evident to us’ – that is,
evident to Aristotle and the audience – are the ‘starting-point’ of the
whole discussion (1095b4-b6). There is a set of ethical beliefs that is
supposed to be shared by its members. And the fact of good upbring-
ing is commonly thought to imply that, for instance, sceptical chal-
lenges posed by Callicles or Thrasymachus are not to be addressed:
everyone understands that injustice is bad for you, or that a tyrant is
not the happiest man of all. But while there are ethical beliefs agreed
on at the outset, there is no theoretical account capable to justify
those beliefs. The audience may know that an action or a life is
good, but not know why. Good upbringing may equip you with pat-
terns of good behaviour in a range of circumstances, but it is not ex-
pected to hand you a reason why this particular act is to be judged
good. Aristotle’s task is to provide the missing reason.9
If this sort of picture is taken on board, then one might say that
people in Aristotle’s audience already lead broadly happy lives.10
Their knowledge of happiness is purely practical, taking the form
of particularised precepts tailored to specific circumstances. But as
far as the nature of happiness is concerned, then, on the contrary,
the job is to be done by Aristotle. The audience does not consist
of philosophers, or in any event, of accomplished philosophers.
9 See R. Kraut, ‘How to Justify Ehical Propositions: Aristotle’s
Method’, in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
(Blackwell, 2006) for more details on the shared assumptions of Aristotle’s
audience.
10 See S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991).
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As they are not credited with the theoretical knowledge of happiness,
they are not thought to know the nature of happiness. Indeed, if we
were to think otherwise, it is obscure what the point of the relevant
parts of Books I and X is supposed to be. On any sensible reading
they are supposed to yield exactly the concept of happiness.
No less sensible, however, is to assume, as Prichard did, that the
audience had linguistic knowledge of the term ‘eudaimonia’. It was
a word, as we said, in their native tongue, rather than a specialised
newly invented technical term. Nor did Aristotle intend to invent a
new meaning and attach it to the familiar string of shapes and
noises. And if the question is, ‘What did the audience mean by the
term “eudaimonia”?’, then, Prichard reasons, the answer is
obvious: ‘By “eudaimonia” they meant whatever the term “happi-
ness” means in English – that is, happiness.’ Since we have already
admitted that the speakers in Aristotle’s audience did not know the
nature of happiness, we seem to have painted ourselves into a
corner here. On one hand, the speakers do not know what happiness
is, while on the other they know the meaning of the term ‘happiness’.
I amwilling to speculate that Prichard, in slipping eventually towards
the happiness= pleasure formula, saw no way out of this dilemma
and chose to embrace its second horn at the expense of the first.
Thus he says that ‘we’ – i.e. Aristotle and his audience – know the
nature of happiness, because ‘we all know the nature of that for
which the word “happiness” stands’ (112–13).
Prichard relies, in other words, on the following principle:
Necessarily, for every speaker x: if x knows the meaning
of ‘eudaimonia
‘
, then x knows the nature of eudaimonia.
(2)
And moreover, Prichard is also apparently committed to a stronger
claim:
To specify the meaning of ‘eudaimonia’ is to specify the nature of
eudaimonia.
Because Prichard believes that Aristotle and his audience knew the
meaning of ‘eudaimonia’, he is led to conclude that they also knew
the nature of eudaimonia, and that since ‘eudaimonia’ means plea-
sure, the nature of eudaimonia is constituted by pleasure. Neither
principle is unassailable. We only need to resist the weaker principle
(2). I will argue that there is more than one meaning associated with
‘eudaimonia’. The principle holds for one kind of meaning, but it
fails for another. The dilemma that haunted Prichard is spurious:
we should be able to embrace its both horns.
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6. Two concepts of happiness
We often acquire meanings of terms by being introduced to their ex-
tensions. Demonstrative identification is the most ubiquitous
medium. ‘What do you mean by “a rabbit”?’, you ask, and instead
of giving you a lecture in zoology, of which I am incapable, I point
at a nearby rabbit. Understanding acquired is imperfect, but it
allows you communicating well on a range of occasions where you
are now able to distinguish rabbits from other items. Descriptive
identification is another means. If you query me on the meaning of
‘silver’, it is too expensive to produce silver objects to enlighten
you. Instead I provide you with a description: ‘That ring you saw
onMr NN’s finger is made of silver.’The purpose is the same: to re-
cognise silver objects in the multitude of other objects. Both methods
elucidate meanings by extension. I do not give you a definition of rab-
bithood or silverhood, much less a reductive definition. Your
capacity for formulating what a rabbit is is virtually non-existent.
Your narrowly linguistic understanding though is good enough to
let you get by on many occasions. It would, I think, be wrong to
declare that, after such learning by extension, you remain entirely
ignorant of the meaning of the relevant terms.
The learning by extension provides a practical capacity of more or
less efficient communication. To test the speaker’s extensionalist un-
derstanding of the term for X one ought to expose him to the use of
that term on different occasions and to see how adequately that
speaker behaves on these occasions. We could say that the speaker
in such a case is equipped with a recognitional concept of X. There
is another method whereby the meaning of the term for X is given
by naming some putative essential characteristics of X. Recognitional
abilities may, or may not, improve as a result, but the aim at any
rate is different. The aim is to link the given concept – of rabbit or
silver – to other concepts and eventually to produce a theoretical
concept of X. A zoological enquiry will reveal the links between
rabbits and other species, while a chemical enquiry will link the prop-
erties of silver with those of other metals. This type of conceptual
understanding thus corresponds to improved theoretical understand-
ing, similarly characterised by unification and integration.11 It involves
the possession of a ‘theory’ of X. Rather than smoothening communi-
cation, the possession of a theoretical concept ultimately is supposed to
improve our understanding of theworld. Another, and a less grandiose,
11 See M. Friedman, ‘Explanation and Scientific Understanding’,
Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974), 5–19.
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consequence is this: to possess a theoretical concept of X is to be able to
deal with the question about the ‘nature’ ofX.To query the nature of X
is to query the defining characteristics of X. The theoretical concept of
X is supposed exactly those characteristics. And the way to achieve this
is by establishing conceptual links to other phenomena.12
This kind of talk is to an extent parallel to Carnap’s well-known
discussion of explication.13 One could certainly say that a speaker, en-
tirely ignorant of zoology and only acquainted with a few rabbits in
his backyard and their pictures in Alice in Wonderland, has an
‘inexact’ classificatory concept of rabbithood. In the process of zool-
ogical enquiry the concept gets more ‘exact’. At every stage of his
familiarity with the term ‘rabbit’ the speaker is in possession of a
concept of rabbithood, less or more exact. With that I am in complete
agreement. I would insist, however, that what is essential to the sub-
sequent improvement of exactitude is not, as Carnap suggested, the
mathematisation and formalisation of inexact concepts, but instead
the network of theoretical links they acquire in relation to other
concepts.
Back to happiness. In this instance, one can assume, the speakers in
Aristotle’s audience had no claim to a theory of happiness, nor did
they have any theoretical concept of happiness. Likely introduced
to the terms ‘eudaimonia’ or ‘eudaimon’ by the method of extension,
they were in possession of a recognitional concept of happiness.
Certain individuals or certain lives were picked out and stipulated
as ‘happy’. Other individuals or other lives were designated as
‘unhappy’. Solon and Pericles could be recognised as happy, while
Priam and Ajax as unhappy. This kind of learning allowed them a
semblance of smooth communication in a fairly limited range of cir-
cumstances. Many people around them – ‘the mass of mankind’, as
Aristotle says in I.V – could judge Sardanapallus or the Persian
king happy. People of the Aristotle’s audience presumably resisted
this use of the predicate ‘is happy’. Such disagreements prompted
both sides to search for at least an elementary theory of happiness,
thus initiating a proper conceptual enquiry. But for the disagreement
to become evident, the original agreement, in the smaller community
of Aristotle’s audience, should have been possible. And for it to be
possible, the samples through which the speakers learned the
12 See T. Burge, Foundations of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007)
for a related discussion and the distinction between lexical and translational
meaning.
13 See R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1950).
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extension of the term should have displayed similar features. In the
case of rabbits and silver such relevant similar features are their per-
ceptual properties. Those properties prompted the recognition of,
say, different rabbit-like animals as ‘rabbits’. That could, and often
does, happen when the speakers remain entirely ignorant of the bio-
logical properties of rabbits.
The question now is whether we can discover analogous properties
of ‘happy men’, such as Solon and Pericles, which allowed their
classification as happy men by Aristotle’s audience before the
enquiry of NE began. These properties cannot describe deep and
complex states of the individuals in question: we assume that the
learning took place among the people not susceptible to complex re-
flection. So those classificatory properties would have to be manifest
at a superficial level. And one candidate here is the property of enjoy-
ment. The speakers classify ‘happy’ individuals based on how much
enjoyment and how little pain these individuals have. In talking
about enjoyment we of course should mean manifestations of enjoy-
ment. It is possible for an individual to conceal, on a given occasion,
his real psychological state. In any event, enjoyment or observable
signs thereof would serve the guide for the application of the predi-
cate ‘is happy’. But in mastering of the use of that predicate the
speaker also realises that the property of enjoyment is not equivalent
to the property of happiness. The nature of happiness – the question
what the property of happiness really is – is, at this pre-reflective
stage, left undecided. Perhaps it is equivalent to the property of
living well, as the Greek etymology suggests and Aristotle concurs;
however, this is no substitute for a solution, since it simply rephrases
the problem in terms of ‘wellness’ or ‘the good’. The situation, then,
is analogous to the case of rabbithood. Easily observable properties in
both cases are, so far as they go, reliable guides in using the term.
They are instrumental in fixing the extension of the term. But
alongwith them there are properties not immediately available to per-
ception that will be at work in refining the concept. What those prop-
erties are should be the subject of a proper theoretical enquiry.
That the property of enjoyment should be intimately connected
with the very meaning of ‘eudaimonia’ is indirectly confirmed by
several familiar passages in Book I. A life containing sufferings and
misfortunes ‘no one’ would call ‘happy’, unless he were ‘maintaining
the thesis at all costs’ (1096a1). Again, no one would call Priam
‘happy’, since his end was tragic and painful (1100a9). In all such in-
stances Aristotle evidently appeals to common intuitions held with
regard to eudaimonia. And those intuitions unambiguously tell us,
according to Aristotle, that a happy life is largely a pleasant life. It
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is well to notice that included among those people are not only the
theorists of eudaimonia, but equally a man on the street, that is,
someone not to be credited with any considered view of eudaimonia.
The source of these intuitions, we conclude, should reside in the
recognitional concept of eudaimonia shared by average Greek
speakers.
In this sense, therefore, Prichard’s contention that by ‘eudaimonia’
Aristotle meant something like ‘enjoyment’ is vindicated. But it war-
rants no smooth transition to interpreting Aristotle’s view as hedon-
ism. The reason by now is obvious: generally, having a recognitional
concept of X does not entail having any particular theoretical concept
of X. For a hedonist, the theoretical concept of happiness (‘eudaimo-
nia’, ‘welfare’, ‘well-being’) has a strong phenomenalist flavour.14
The extension of its predicate should depend entirely on the distri-
bution of psychological states of the subjects. The way a subject
enjoys a given state of affairs fixes the amount of happiness he
possesses in that state of affairs. Left ignored are the sources of his
enjoyment. Their nature matters not at all for the estimation of
happiness. Now, someone endowed with the recognitional concept
of happiness along the lines described in this section is at liberty to
reject such phenomenalist concept of happiness. The perceptual
marks of happiness – enjoyment and suffering – can be taken by
him to be no more than marks. It is open to him to construe the
concept of happiness in a realistic fashion. Happiness will depend
not only on the kind of psychological attitudes of enjoyment and suf-
fering the subject has, but also on the states of affairs that produce
those attitudes. A parallel move is made in the case of natural classi-
ficatory concepts. Rabbits are initially classified by their appearance
and superficial behaviour, and this is how, as we have conjectured,
speakers learn the recognitional concept of ‘rabbithood’. But a
further enquiry classifies rabbits by the kind of zoological properties
hidden from a casual observer. Those properties are then posited as
the causes of the rabbits’ appearance and behaviour.
However the case may be with natural classificatory concepts, if we
choose to adopt a form of realism about happiness, there are some
tricky issues to address. On one hand, we say, enjoyment is nothing
more than a manifestation of certain realistically construed states of
the individual (call them ‘r-states’). But on the other hand, we also
know that just about anything may cause a psychological attitude of
enjoyment (or suffering). An individual A derives pleasure from
14 See P.K. Unger, Identity, Consciousness, and Value (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990) for this terminological use.
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doing X (or being X). An individual B abhors X. Suppose that X falls
into the class of activities which increase happiness, other things
being equal. Then, in engaging in X, do both A and B increase the
amount of happiness they have? If, in our happiness judgements,
r-states take priority over enjoyment states, as they apparently
should, then both of them increase their happiness. But then, in
our verdict on the individual B, there is a too big departure from
the original recognitional meaning of the term ‘happiness’ linked,
in our assumption, to the experience of pleasure. It now turns out
that enjoyment influences not in the least the degree of happiness.
And then we must have been misrepresented our enquiry. We did
not explicate the recognitional concept of happiness, but rather
created a purely technical, novel theoretical concept. But if so, in ad-
vancing our enquiry we had no right to appeal, as Aristotle did, and
almost everyone else still does, to commonsensical intuitions about
the use of the term ‘happiness’.
Aristotle’s clever way out of this difficulty was to treat pleasure as a
necessary attribute of the r-states themselves. What these states are
was supposed to be determined by the theory of the virtuous activity
of the soul. And any such activity was supposed to yield pleasure. One
of course could still wonder why pleasure and r-states, belonging to
entirely different categories, cooperate together in advancing happi-
ness. Or one might wonder whether an individual with few r-states
and plenty of pleasure – i.e. an evil individual satisfied with his situ-
ation – should also have a decent amount of happiness. Aristotle de-
livers the final blow in X.3: virtuous activities alone could produce
pleasure legitimately so understood. Activities that were not virtuous
could produce at most ‘bad’ pleasures – that is, attitudes not really
pleasant at all. The significance of this idea is in officially making
r-states necessary and sufficient conditions of happiness. Pleasure,
far from being an independent necessary condition of happiness, is
now fully incorporated into the theory of virtue.
Though the theory of bad pleasures is, I think, highly problematic,
here is not the place to assess it.15 Suppose we were to accept it. We
will even then encounter cases where impeccably virtuous conduct,
satisfying all the conditions imposed by the theory of virtue, fails to
yield pleasure. One of the more dramatic such cases is self-sacrifice
on the battlefield. And this much is clear: if one were wholeheartedly
15 Some commentators place it at the forefront of Aristotle’s rejection of
hedonism. See J. Annas, ‘Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness’, in A.
Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (University of
California Press, 1980).
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committed to a realistic virtue-based theory of happiness, disposing
of any independent contribution enjoyment could make, then the
absence of pleasure (and the presence of pain) would have been im-
material for the level of happiness. Awholehearted realist about hap-
piness would gladly bite the bullet. But as the discussion in IX.8
makes plain, Aristotle approaches such cases as a major difficulty.
He is at pains to show how even there the subject receives his share
of enjoyment. To me this constitutes evidence to the effect that
Aristotle does not commit himself to a purely realistic theory of hap-
piness and still treats pleasure as an independent factor.
If Aristotle had any such implicit hedonist commitment, the diag-
nosis must extend beyond his own particular account of happiness. It
should generally be the case that any theory of happiness (or of ‘well-
being’) beginning with ordinary language intuitions about the nature
of happiness cannot completely sever its link to hedonism. The rudi-
mentary concept of happiness obtained by the method of extension –
typically acts of demonstrative or descriptive identification – fixes the
link with pleasure. In the course of explicating this concept, driven by
our theoretical needs, we can link happiness to r-states. Those will ty-
pically lack any conceptual connection with pleasure. But when there
are situations in which pleasure and r-states are no longer correlated,
the theorist will face a choice of either following his theoretical
convictions and dismissing the factor of pleasure altogether, or else
preserving the factor of pleasure. The price to be paid in choosing
the first alternative is the empirical inadequacy of the theory – that
is, the failure to satisfy our ordinary intuitions. While for some the-
orists this would be a small price to pay, Aristotle is a known
staunch defender of ordinary intuitions in ethics. The price to be
paid in choosing the second alternative is the return to a version of he-
donism, thus largely nullifying the value of the theoretical edifice
built upon the doctrine of r-states. The conflict, therefore, originates
in the basic epistemic procedure of ethical theory. Aristotle’s
struggles in NE are a useful illustration of its intensity.
7. Conclusion
Let me recapitulate the main points emerging from our discussion.
(1) At the heart of Prichard’s argument is the emphasis on
Aristotle’s interpretation of goodness as goodness-for-me. Once
this move is completed, it is hard, indeed impossible, to detach the
nature of happiness from the ingredient of egocentric benefit. But
any such benefit will eventually come down to the agent’s own
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‘gratification’. If we identify gratification with pleasure, as we appar-
ently should, there is no escape from an egoistic version of hedonism.
(2) The best textual evidence for Aristotle’s slide into egoistic he-
donism is available in the discussion of heroic self-sacrifice. A
staunch anti-egoist would approach the matter very differently. It
would be no problem for him to say that the heroic act of sacrificing
one’s life bestows good on others, though not on oneself. That
Aristotle twists and turns the issue to show the profit that the
action yields for the hero is a proof of his egoistic and hedonistic
commitments.
(3) Prichard is wrong in trying to locate the proof of Aristotle’s he-
donism in Book I. His interpretation ultimately founders on the con-
nection between knowing the meaning of ‘happiness’ and knowing
the nature of happiness. One can have the former without having
the latter. It is true that Aristotle and his audience of competent
Greek speakers were in possession of a meaning of ‘eudaimonia’.
But that competence and that knowledge did not necessarily equip
them with the knowledge of essential characteristics of eudaimonia,
or as we say, its nature. The latter issue was supposed to be resolved
by Aristotle’s enquiry in NE.
Finally, I have made no attempt to give a comprehensive hedonist
interpretation of NE. Any such interpretation will have to come to
grips with the theory of bad pleasures, mentioned above in §6, as
well as to supply a systematic hedonist account of good-for-me.16
Neither of these objectives has been achieved. My purpose was
more limited. Apart from clarifying and to an extent defending
Prichard’s argument, it was to identify the roots of Aristotle’s (poss-
ible) hedonism. And arguablymore ambitiously, it was to point at the
hedonistic tendency of any theory of well-being that pays respect to, a
fortiori derives legitimacy from, the ordinary intuitions regarding its
subject.17
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16 See R. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton University
Press, 1989) for an anti-hedonist interpretation of good-for-me.
17 I am grateful to Harry Lesser, Yasemin Topac, and the audience at
the University of Tel Aviv for useful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper.
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